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JORDAN, Circuit Judge. 
 
Kenyatta Johnson and Damon K. Roberts (collectively, 
“Appellants”) appeal the District Court’s grant of summary 
judgment for the City of Philadelphia (the “City”), contending 
the District Court erroneously concluded that a City 
ordinance prohibiting the posting of signs on street poles 
passes constitutional muster under the First, Fourteenth, and 
Twenty-Fourth Amendments of the United States 




A. The Ordinance 
 
Appellants challenge the constitutionality of a City 
ordinance that prohibits the posting of signs on utility poles, 
streetlights, sign posts, and trees in a public right-of-way.  
Enacted after a similar ordinance was enjoined on First 
Amendment grounds,1
                                              
1 The prior ordinance was enjoined because it was 
content-based and provided the City with unfettered 
discretion in deciding which signs could be posted.  See Bella 
Vista United v. City of Phila., No. 04-1014, 2004 WL 
825311, at *4-7 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 15, 2004). 
 the ordinance now at issue was 
designed to cure the earlier ordinance’s constitutional 
infirmities (App. at 110; 118) and to promote public safety 
and aesthetics in the City (see App. at 108-09 (testimony from 
the Director of Legislative Affairs for the City’s Department 
of Licenses and Inspections stating that signs are a “source of 
blight” that “[a]side from being visually unattractive ... also 
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present[] problems related to public safety, by causing 
distractions for motorists operating vehicles”)). 
 
Specifically, the present ordinance states that, except 
as provided in accordance with a program permitting banners 
under certain circumstances (the “Banner Program”),2
 
 no 
person may post any “banners, pennants, placards, posters, 
stickers, advertising flags, [or] plaques,” Philadelphia Code 
§ 10-1201, on any “utility pole,” “streetlight,” “traffic or 
parking sign or device, including any post to which such sign 
or device is attached,” “historical marker,” or “City-owned 
tree or tree in the public right-of-way,” id. § 10-1202(a)(1)-
(5).  The ordinance further provides that any violating sign 
“may be removed by the Department of Licenses & 
Inspections or its designees,” id. § 10-1203(a), with the party 
“responsible for the posting of [the] sign” bearing “the cost 
incurred in [its] removal” as well as “a penalty of $75,” id. 
§ 10-1203(b).  The ordinance does not prohibit signs on 
private property, or otherwise restrict communication. 
B. Appellants’ Constitutional Challenge 
 
 At the time their actions were brought, Appellants 
were both candidates for political office in an area of the City 
that contains “a classic urban landscape of row house 
                                              
2 The ordinance’s restrictions do not extend to the 
posting of signs on “a streetlight provided the sign complies 
with the requirements of the Banner Program, as defined by 
regulations promulgated by the Department of Streets.”  
Philadelphia Code § 10-1202(b).  The Banner Program 
permits high flying banners constructed of nylon or similar 
material to hang atop City street poles.   
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neighborhoods, where most homes have no front yard.”3  
(App. at 56.)  By their own description, Appellants had 
relatively scarce resources to expend on their campaigns.  
Johnson spent only $9,693.78 on his campaign, and Roberts 
spent $14,698.00 with unpaid debts of $7,187.00.  They assert 
that, given their limited funds, they would have ordinarily 
relied heavily on signs posted on street poles to spread their 
political messages.4
 
  However, if they had done so, they each 
faced the possibility of incurring significant fines because of 
the City’s ordinance.  Indeed, Johnson received a letter from 
the City advising him that he must remove any signs placed in 
contravention of the ordinance or “be billed for the cost 
incurred for the removal plus a $75 penalty,” (App. at 71), 
and Roberts, like several other political candidates and private 
businesses responsible for violating the City’s ordinance, 
received numerous tickets.     
                                              
3 Roberts was an unsuccessful Democratic Party 
primary candidate for Philadelphia City Council in the May 
2007 primary.  Johnson was a Democratic Party nominee for 
State Representative in the 186th legislative district, and 
ultimately won the primary and general election for that 
position.  Initially, Appellants brought separate civil actions 
challenging the City’s ordinance.  After permitting Johnson to 
amend his complaint to add Roberts as a plaintiff, however, 
the District Court consolidated the two cases and closed 
Roberts’s separate action.   
4 Johnson, for example, purchased 5,000 signs for his 
campaign.  Such signs were available for as little as $0.20 per 
sign.   
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In support of their constitutional challenge, Appellants 
submitted affidavits from Johnson and his campaign manager, 
as well as a letter-report authored by Joe Long of the 
Northampton County Democratic Committee.  Long’s report 
is fashioned as an expert opinion regarding the ordinance’s 
impact on Appellants’ campaigns.  It claims that the City’s 
ordinance “totally bans one of the most effective campaign 
tools – political signs,” which “eliminate[s] any chance of 
electoral success” for candidates with limited resources, 
inasmuch as political signs are inexpensive and “can be 
localized in a fashion that no other medium offers.”  (App. at 
227b.5
 
)  The affidavits are to the same effect, declaring that 
street signs are an extremely effective campaign tool that 
have no substitute.   
C. The District Court Proceedings 
 
After Johnson filed his initial complaint, he moved for 
a preliminary injunction.  The District Court referred the 
motion to a Magistrate Judge, who held a hearing on the 
motion and denied it, observing that “[t]he content-neutrality 
of the challenged ordinance has been conceded” (App. at 47) 
and deciding that Johnson was unlikely to succeed on the 
                                              
5 The appendix contains pagination errors; it is 
consecutively paginated from pages 1 to 233 at which point 
the pagination reverts to page 224 before ending on page 
237.  Thus, there are duplicate pages in the appendix 
numbered 224, 225, 226, 227, 228, 229, 230, 231, 232, and 
233.  For citation purposes, we have chosen to refer to the 
first set of duplicate numbering as App. 224a to App. 233a, 
and to the second set of duplicated numbering as App. 224b 
to App. 233b. 
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merits.  As noted supra note 3, Roberts was later added as a 
plaintiff and his own civil action was consolidated with 
Johnson’s.  The City then moved for summary judgment, 
which was granted.  The District Court concluded that there 
was no genuine issue of material fact and that the City was 
entitled to judgment on Appellants’ claims.     
 





Appellants argue that the City’s ordinance violates the 
First, Fourteenth, and Twenty-Fourth Amendments, and that 
the District Court erred by concluding otherwise and granting 
the City’s motion for summary judgment.  We address those 
contentions in turn. 
 
                                              
6 The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. § 1331.  We have jurisdiction over this appeal under 
28 U.S.C. § 1291, and exercise “plenary review of [the] 
district court’s grant of summary judgment.”  Funk v. CIGNA 
Grp. Life Ins., 648 F.3d 182, 190 (3d Cir. 2011).  
Accordingly, we view the facts in Appellants’ favor to 
determine whether the District Court correctly found that 
“there [was] no genuine dispute as to any material fact and 
[that the City was] entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”  
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); see Funk, 648 F.3d at 190 (“Summary 
judgment is proper if there is no genuine issue of material fact 
and if, viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the 
non-moving party, the moving party is entitled to judgment as 
a matter of law.” (citation omitted)). 
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A. Appellants’ First Amendment Claims7
 
 
Appellants allege that the City’s ordinance violates the 
First Amendment because it is a restriction on political 
speech.  See U.S. Const. amend. I (“Congress shall make no 
law ... abridging the freedom of speech ... .”); Members of 
City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 792 n.2 
(1984) (“Under the Fourteenth Amendment, city ordinances 
are within the scope of [the First Amendment’s] limitation on 
governmental authority.”).   
 
1. Whether the Ordinance is Content 
Neutral 
 
The first step in assessing the First Amendment claims 
is to determine whether the City’s ordinance is content-
neutral or content-based.  Rappa v. New Castle Cnty., 18 F.3d 
1043, 1053 (3d Cir. 1994).  “If a [restriction on speech] is 
content-based, then the [City] is required ‘to show that the 
regulation is necessary to serve a compelling [government] 
interest and that it is narrowly drawn to achieve that end.’”  
Id. (quoting Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 321 (1988) (internal 
marks omitted)).  If, however, a regulation is content-neutral, 
a different, more lenient test applies.  See id. at 1053-54.  
Content-neutral ordinances, even if imposed “in a public 
forum,” do not offend the First Amendment as long as the 
restrictions (1) “are narrowly tailored to serve a significant 
governmental interest”; and (2) “leave open ample alternative 
                                              
7 Counts One and Two of Appellants’ complaint plead 
two separate First Amendment claims in connection with 
their challenge to the City’s ordinance.  Because those claims 
are essentially identical, we treat them collectively. 
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channels for communication of the information.”  Id. at 1054 
(quoting Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 
(1989)); see Melrose v. City of Pittsburgh, 613 F.3d 380, 388 
(3d Cir. 2010) (same). 
 
 Here, resolving the threshold question of content 
neutrality is straightforward.  When asked at oral argument, 
Appellants’ counsel acknowledged that the ordinance is 
content-neutral.  Although their briefing periodically implies 
otherwise,8
                                              
8 For example, Appellants’ briefing states that because 
the ordinance “totally bans posting of political signs within 
the public right of way,” it must be “subject to the highest 
level of scrutiny that applies to the regulation of a public 
forum.”  (Appellants’ Br. at 13 (emphasis added).)  
Appellants also suggest that the ordinance is content-based 
because it favors commercial speech, given the opportunity 
for such speech afforded by the Banner Program.  However, 
as the District Court correctly observed, the claim that the 
Banner Program favors commercial speech is factually 
unsupported.  Moreover, the Banner Program is administered 
separately, and Appellants – by their own representation at 
oral argument – did not apply to participate in it.  Therefore, 
the assertion that the Banner Program favors commercial 
speech cannot be credited in assessing the ordinance’s 
constitutionality. 
 Appellants have conceded the point, and they 
were wise to do so.  We thus take the content-neutrality of the 
ordinance as a given and turn to assess its constitutionality 
under that rubric.  Accordingly, we must consider whether the 
ordinance is narrowly tailored to serve a significant 
government interest and whether it leaves open ample 
alternative channels for communication. 
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2. Whether the Ordinance is Narrowly 
Tailored to Serve a Significant 
Government Interest 
 
i. The Asserted Government Interest 
 
Appellants first argue that the City’s ordinance does 
not serve a significant government interest.  As a preliminary 
matter, it is clear from Supreme Court precedent that “the 
goals of ‘traffic safety and the appearance of the city[ ] are 
substantial governmental goals.’”  Riel v. City of Bradford, 
485 F.3d 736, 751 (3d Cir. 2007) (quoting Metromedia, Inc. 
v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 507-08 (1981) (plurality 
opinion)); see Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. at 805 (“It is 
well settled that the state may legitimately exercise its police 
powers to advance esthetic values”); Rappa, 18 F.3d at 1075 
(“[T]he sufficiency of the government’s interest in aesthetics 
and safety has, by this juncture, become unquestioned.”).  
Here, as previously noted, the record indicates that the City’s 
ordinance was intended to promote those legitimate and 
significant values.  (See App. at 109 (referring to blight and to 
the safety of motorists).) 
 
Nevertheless, citing our decision in Rappa v. New 
Castle County, in which we held that a regulation prohibiting 
campaign signs in public rights-of-way was an 
unconstitutional content-based restriction on speech,9
                                              
9 In Rappa, the plaintiff asserted a First Amendment 
challenge after “a large number of [his political campaign] 
signs along Delaware’s roadways” were “peremptorily 
removed by state and local authorities on the grounds that 




Appellants argue that the City’s asserted interest in safety and 
aesthetics “fails.”  (Appellants’ Br. at 14-15.)  Their argument 
seems to be that there is no evidence supporting those 
proffered considerations, particularly when the City “allows 
banners to be posted [under the Banner Program] on the very 
poles where it bans political signs.”  (Appellants’ Br. at 24.)  
To a large extent, then, Appellants’ contention that the City’s 
ordinance does not serve a significant state interest depends 
on the premise that the City’s ordinance targets political 
signs.  The legislation we struck down in Rappa did that, see 
Rappa, 18 F.3d at 1047 (“Although Rappa’s [political] signs 
were barred, a number of other types of signs ... were 
permitted.”), and we rejected the government’s argument in 
that case that the restriction on political signs was justified 
due to the fact that “campaign signs tend to proliferate more 
than other signs and therefore create greater safety and 
aesthetic problems than other signs,” id. at 1070. 
 
Here, however, unlike the disputed ordinance in 
Rappa, the City’s ordinance is content-neutral – a point 
which, as discussed earlier, Appellants have expressly 
acknowledged.   In other words, the City’s ordinance does not 
simply prohibit political speech; it prohibits all speech in the 
form of temporary signs on utility poles, streetlights, sign 
posts, and trees in the public right-of-way, and there is no 
evidence that it is selectively enforced or was crafted for the 
purpose of prohibiting political speech in particular.  Instead, 
every indication in the record is that the ordinance was 
intended to promote public safety and reduce blight.  (See 
App. at 109.)  Under these circumstances, the City’s 
                                                                                                     
States of Delaware ..., the County of New Castle ..., and the 
City of Wilmington.”  Rappa, 18 F.3d at 1047. 
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judgment that such goals are advanced by the ordinance is 
accorded deference “unless [that judgment] is facially 
unreasonable.”  Frumer v. Cheltenham Twp., 709 F.2d 874, 
877 (3d Cir. 1983) (citing Metromedia, 453 U.S. at 507-08).  
Because we cannot say the City’s judgment fails that test, we 
are bound to recognize that the ordinance advances 
significant government interests.  Id.   
 
ii. The Scope of the Ordinance  
 
That does not end our inquiry, however, as the 
ordinance must be narrowly tailored to serve the City’s 
interest in safety and aesthetics.  Rappa, 18 F.3d at 1054.  In 
order to be narrowly tailored, a regulation “need not be the 
least restrictive or least intrusive means of” furthering the 
identified interest.  Ward, 491 U.S. at 798.  “Rather, the 
requirement of narrow tailoring is satisfied ‘so long as the ... 
regulation promotes a substantial government interest that 
would be achieved less effectively absent the regulation.’”  
Id. at 799 (citation omitted).   
 
Appellants argue that the City’s ordinance is not 
narrowly tailored because it “chose to solve its sign problem 
... by the use of an unconstitutional sledge hammer” that 
“banned all speech.”  (Appellants’ Br. at 19.)  The Supreme 
Court’s decision in Members of City Council v. Taxpayers for 
Vincent is instructive in assessing that contention.  There, the 
Court considered the constitutionality of an ordinance that 
was, in all material respects, similar to the ordinance at issue 
here.  Most importantly, like the City’s ordinance, the 
ordinance in Taxpayers for Vincent “prohibit[ed] the posting 
of signs on public property,” 466 U.S. at 791, but not on 
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private property, see id. at 811.  The Supreme Court held that 
the Taxpayers for Vincent ordinance was narrowly tailored to 
serve the interests of safety and aesthetics because it 
“respond[ed] precisely to the substantive problem which 
legitimately concern[ed] the City” and “curtail[ed] no more 
speech than [was] necessary to accomplish its purpose.”  Id. 
at 810; see id. at 808 (“By banning these signs, the City did 
no more than eliminate the exact source of the evil it sought 
to remedy.”).  Moreover, the Court in Taxpayers for Vincent 
reached that conclusion even though the ordinance at issue – 
like the present ordinance – was arguably of insufficient 
scope to fully remedy the evil caused by signs in that it did 
not ban signs on private property.  See id. at 811 (“The 
private citizen’s interest in controlling the use of his own 
property justifies the disparate treatment.”). 
 
The City’s ordinance in this case is, for all practical 
purposes, indistinguishable from the ordinance upheld in 
Taxpayers for Vincent as narrowly tailored to serve the same 
interests as are implicated here.  Thus, the City’s ordinance 
can be said to “curtail[] no more speech than is necessary to 
accomplish its purpose.”  Id. at 810.   
 
Appellants’ argument to the contrary appears to 
depend on the belief that the City has “banned all speech.”10
                                              
10 As discussed infra, Appellants’ position is further 
undermined by their expert’s report, which is based on the 
same mistaken belief.  Long criticizes the ordinance’s impact 
on low budget campaigns because “[t]here is absolutely no 
reasonable or viable alternative for an individual to make his 
political views known to his neighbor than the venerable 




In reality, however, the ordinance does not ban all speech; it 
bans only “signs,” and that ban extends only to certain 
specifically defined portions of City property.11
 
  Moreover, it 
can hardly be denied that the City’s interest would be more 
difficult to achieve without the regulation, as the source of the 
problem – the proliferation of signs – would otherwise be 
permitted on City street poles.  Accordingly, we conclude that 
the City’s ordinance is narrowly tailored to serve the 
government’s interests in safety and aesthetics. 
3. Whether the Ordinance Leaves Open 
Ample Alternative Channels of 
Communication 
 
Having determined that the City’s content-neutral 
ordinance is narrowly tailored to serve a significant 
governmental interest, we next examine whether it leaves 
                                                                                                     
(emphasis added).)  But, as Appellants have had to 
acknowledge, the ordinance does not ban yard signs.  Indeed, 
over half of the 5,000 signs Johnson purchased were posted 
on private property, including the windows of houses and 
businesses.   
11 As described above, the term “signs” includes 
“banners, pennants, placards, posters, stickers, advertising 
flags, and plaques.”  Philadelphia Code § 10-1201.  The ban 
on signs extends to signs posted on any City “utility pole,” 
“streetlight,” “traffic or parking sign or device, including any 
post to which such sign or device is attached,” “historical 
marker,” or “City-owned tree or tree in the public right-of-
way.”  Id. § 10-1202(a)(1)-(5).   
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open ample alternative channels for communication.  Rappa, 
18 F.3d at 1054. 
 
Appellants contend that the City’s ordinance does not 
afford sufficient alternative channels because “political 
posters have unique advantages including low cost and 
convenience to achieve name recognition,” especially in 
Philadelphia’s “gritty urban landscape with no front lawns.”  
(Appellants’ Br. at 17, 20.)  Underlying that line of reasoning 
is the notion that Appellants should be afforded the 
opportunity to speak in their preferred, most cost-effective, 
medium.  The law, however, provides no such entitlement.  
See, e.g., Heffron v. Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness, 
Inc., 452 U.S. 640, 647 (1981) (“[T]he First Amendment does 
not guarantee the right to communicate one’s views at all 
times and places or in any manner that may be desired.”). 
 
Instead, “[t]he Supreme Court has required that an 
alternative means of communication provide only a 
‘reasonable opportunity’ for communication of the speaker’s 
message.”  Galena v. Leone, 638 F.3d 186, 203 (3d Cir. 
2011).  Accordingly, a speaker is not entitled to his or her 
favored or most cost-effective mode of communication.  See, 
e.g., Mastrovincenzo v. City of N.Y., 435 F.3d 78, 101 (2d Cir. 
2006) (“The requirement that ‘ample alternative channels’ 
exist does not imply that alternative channels must be perfect 
substitutes for those channels denied to plaintiffs by the 
regulation at hand ... .”).  He or she must simply be afforded 
the opportunity to “reach the ‘intended audience,’” Startzell v. 
City of Phila., 533 F.3d 183, 202 (3d Cir. 2008) (citation 
omitted), in an adequate manner, see Taxpayers for Vincent, 
466 U.S. at 812 (“[A] restriction on expressive activity may 
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be invalid if the remaining modes of communication are 
inadequate.”).   
 
It is clear that the City’s ordinance allows ample 
alternative avenues for communication.  While the ordinance 
in Taxpayers for Vincent – like the City’s ordinance – 
prohibited the posting of signs on street poles, the Supreme 
Court was satisfied with the district court’s finding that there 
was nothing about “the posting of political posters on public 
property [that is] a uniquely valuable or important mode of 
communication.”  466 U.S. at 812.  The Court relied on the 
district court’s finding that the plaintiffs had several 
alternative avenues for communication:  “they remain[ed] 
free to picket and parade, to distribute handbills, to carry 
signs and to post their signs and handbills on their 
automobiles and on private property with the permission of 
the owners thereof.”  Id. at 795.  
 
Here, too, notwithstanding Appellants’ conclusory 
pronouncements that there is simply no way to wage a low-
budget campaign in Philadelphia in compliance with the 
City’s ordinance, the evidence demonstrates that there are 
several other avenues of communication.  Roberts and 
Johnson themselves engaged in other means of 
campaigning,12
                                              
12 Johnson was featured in a South Philadelphia 
newspaper at no cost to his campaign, had a campaign 
website, and also conducted a series of radio advertisements.   
Unfortunately, there is little-to-no information in the record 
about Roberts’s means of campaigning, although it appears 
that he expended campaign funds for printing signs and 
running newspaper advertisements.   
 and, in Johnson’s case at least, it was 
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effective; he waged a successful campaign in spite of the 
ordinance’s restrictions, winning both the Democratic 
primary and the general election for State Representative.  
Furthermore, the City’s ordinance has no bearing on a 
candidate’s ability to enjoy what Appellants’ own expert 
indicated is the single most effective communication 
technique, namely, placing political posters on private 
property.  (See App. at 227b (“There is absolutely no 
reasonable or viable alternative for an individual to make his 
political views known to his neighbor than the venerable 
political poster in his or her front yard.”).) 
 
As Appellants evidently recognize, then, there is 
tremendous value in being able to post political signs on 
private property.  Likewise, the Supreme Court has noted: 
 
residential signs play an important part in 
political campaigns, during which they are 
displayed to signal the resident’s support for 
particular candidates, parties, or causes.  They 
may not afford the same opportunities for 
conveying complex ideas as do other media, but 
residential signs have long been an important 
and distinct medium of expression. 
 
City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 512 U.S. 43, 55 (1994) (internal 
footnote omitted).  We have likewise observed that “[p]osting 
a sign on one’s own property may not only be easier and less 
expensive than alternative means of communication, but may 
be a unique means of self-expression for the property owner.”  
Rappa, 18 F.3d at 1077.  It bears emphasis, in this regard, that 
over half of Johnson’s political posters were placed on private 
property.  Clearly, signs on private property are a valuable 
18 
 
and regularly utilized campaign tool that – at least when 
combined with other avenues of communication – provide a 
sufficient alternative to the sign-posting forbidden by the 
City.  Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. at 811-12.  
 
 Because the City’s ordinance is content-neutral, 
narrowly tailored to serve a significant government interest, 
and leaves open ample alternative channels for 
communication, the District Court properly entered judgment 
in the City’s favor on Appellants’ First Amendment claims. 
 
B. Appellants’ Fourteenth Amendment and 
Twenty-Fourth Amendment Claims 
 
Appellants also argue that the District Court erred in 
granting summary judgment against them on their Fourteenth 
Amendment and Twenty-Fourth Amendment claims.13
                                              
13 The City argues that Appellants have waived those 
claims on appeal because they did not properly present them 
in their statement of the issues or summary of the argument.  
See Kost v. Kozakiewicz, 1 F.3d 176, 182 (3d Cir. 1993) (“It 
is well settled that if an appellant fails to comply with [the 
requirement of setting forth an issue in the Statement of the 
Issues and Argument sections], the appellant normally has 
abandoned and waived that issue on appeal and it need not be 
addressed by the court of appeals.”).  While Appellants make 
relatively little reference to the Fourteenth and Twenty-Fourth 
Amendment arguments in their brief, we choose to consider 
them because they do sufficiently appear in Appellants’ 
argument.  Cf. id. (declining to address appellants’ arguments 
where the issues were not set forth in either the issue 
statement or “in the remainder of [the appellants’] brief”). 




Their Fourteenth Amendment claim appears to be 
based on the belief that the Banner Program favors 
commercial speech over political speech and, therefore, 
violates the Equal Protection Clause.  As previously noted, 
however, that factual contention is entirely unsupported by 
the record.  Appellants’ complaint acknowledges as much, 
stating that “[Appellants] are not aware that any political 
candidates ever used the so called ‘Banner Program’ as a 
form of campaigning for political office,” (App. at 63), and 
Appellants concede that they did not seek to participate in 
that program.  Accordingly, there is no genuine issue of 
material fact for trial as to Appellants’ Fourteenth 
Amendment claim.  See Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380-81 
(2007) (summary judgment should be granted when, viewing 
the facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, 
no reasonable jury could find for that party). 
 
Appellants’ Twenty-Fourth Amendment claim is that 
the City’s ordinance is an unlawful poll tax.14
                                              
14 To support their claim, Appellants’ complaint cites 
both the Twenty-Fourth Amendment and the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause.  The Twenty-Fourth 
Amendment provides that the “right of citizens of the United 
States to vote in any primary or other election for President or 
Vice President, ... or for Senator or Representative in 
Congress, shall not be denied or abridged ... by reason of 
failure to pay any poll tax or other tax.”  U.S. Const. amend. 
XXIV, § 1.  The Equal Protection Clause, as Appellants’ 
employ it in this context, prohibits the state from “mak[ing] 
the affluence of the voter or payment of any fee an electoral 
  That too is 
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without foundation.  Conclusively, the Twenty-Fourth 
Amendment, by its express terms, has no application to state 
and local elections.  See U.S. Const. amend. XXIV, § 1 
(relating to the right to vote in certain federal elections).  
Although Appellants point out that “Johnson’s posters are so 
called coat tail items which advocated his election along with 
now President Barrack [sic] Obama,” (Appellants’ Br. at 32), 
the fact that Johnson’s signs included a picture of President 
Obama does not make Johnson’s campaign a federal one to 
which the Twenty-Fourth Amendment would apply.  But 
even if the Twenty-Fourth Amendment were applicable, the 
City’s ordinance would not violate it because it does not 
make any voter pay any fees to vote.  It instead penalizes 
anyone who fails to comply with its provisions.  As the City 
points out, Appellants “confuse the imposition of a poll tax ... 
with the imposition of a penalty upon those who post signs on 
poles.”  (Appellee’s Br. at 33.)  Because there is no evidence 
that the City’s ordinance taxed voters or otherwise made voter 
affluence an electoral standard, there is no issue for trial as to 
Appellants’ Twenty-Fourth Amendment claim and the City is 




For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment 
of the District Court. 
                                                                                                     
standard.”  Harper v. Virginia State Bd. of Elections, 383 
U.S. 663, 666 (1966). 
